Adverse Possession of One’s Own Debt by Clark, Charles E.
COMMENTS
ditioned power, to give him an absolute .interest in the land, is appar-
ently a vested limited interest. And that his option alone does not
give him .2 0  However we may designate his interest in the land, we
may not call that interest vested. It is at least no better than con-
tingent until he has exercised his power. In this respect the position
of the option-holder is not unlike that of the contingent remainder-
man in such a devise as : "Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B if B
marry," or indeed, "if B plant a rose bush on the testator's grave."
Both B and the option-holder must remain without a vested interest
in the respective premises until a specified act has been done, a legal
power exercised. The doing of that act, the exercise of that power,
may be wholly within the sole volition of either; but until its exercise
the interest does not vest.2
G. E. W.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ONE'S OWN DEBT
In a recent discussion in the JOURNAL as to the effect of a new
promise upon the running of the statute of limitations it was not
necessary to determine whether a change in the statute affected only
the remedy and hence did not run counter to constitutional objections.'
This vexed problem was presented in Gilbert v. Selleck (1919, Conn.)
io6 AtI. 439, where the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors decided
that the statute, in the case of a contract obligation, does not destroy
the debt but merely takes away the remedy, and that one has no "prop-
erty" in the bar of the statute, thus distinguishing a debt from realty
or chattels where the "property" passes and both "legal title" and "real
ownership" become vested by the running of the statute. The Court
therefore held that even after the statute had run the legislature might
provide an additional period during which suit could be brought upon a
contract of indemnity.
The only direct authority cited by the Court is the mooted case of
Campbell v. Holt,2 decided by a bare majority in the United States
Supreme Court.3 It is surprising that the opinion in the Connecticut
case does not indicate how great is the divergence of opinion upon
- But might not a leasehold interest be such a "vested limited interest," so as to
bring the lessee with option to purchase within Gray's language?
'Washburn, Real Property (6th ed. 19o2) secs. 1555, 556. See also Tiffany,
Future Interests (1913) 29 L. QUART. REv. 290, 298-301.
I (igig) 28 YAiL LAw JOURNAL, 817.
2 (1885) 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209.
'The only other authority cited is a dictum by Judge Henry Wade Rogers in
Re Sal",on (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 249 Fed. 300. In this case the court held that
a part payment made by an insolvent "takes the debt out of the statute of
limitations" so as to make it a provable debt in bankruptcy proceedings, over-
ruling L. Hand, J. (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 239 Fed. 413.
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the point, nor does it refer to the many criticisms of Campbell v. Holt.4
Among other critics of that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, while on the
Massachusetts bench, stated that the repeal of the statute even in the
case of a debt required "the property of one person to be given to
another."5  In another connection he has attempted a yet more direct
analogy between a chose in action and a chattel by assimilating the
sale of a horse to the assignment of a money claim.6 So far as pre-
cedents go, however, while there seems to be a complete unanimity of
opinion that the amending statute cannot touch the case of chattels
after the original statute has run without running afoul of the con-
stitutional restrictions, 7 yet the cases are in hopeless conflict as to the
effect of such an amendment in the case of a chose in action.8
Is there sound basis for a distinction between choses and chattels
in this regard? It may be admitted at once that we all sense a differ-
ence. The conception of A in possession of B's horse does not strike
us as strange while the same cannot be said of the conception of C
in possession of his own debt owed to D. But is there a difference
here justifying divergent legal results? Are the legal relations of A
to B and B to A so unlike those of C to D and D to C as to require A
to be treated differently than C and B than D? It is submitted, on
the contrary, that the relations are so nearly identical as logically to
require similar rulings in the absence of a compelling reason of policy.
See Ames, 3 Select Essays (199o) 569 that Campbell v. Holt "stands almost
alone" and Chambers v. Gallagher (1i1) 177 Calif. 704, 171 Pac. 931, that the con-
trary holding is supported "by the almost universal course of decisions in the
United States," citing decisions from twenty states. It is said that the doctrine
of Campbell v. Holt "is undoubtedly technically correct but is opposed to the
great weight of authority." Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) 49.
'Danforth v. Groton Water Co. (190) 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E. 1033.
'Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles (1916) 242 U. S. 7, 37 Sup. Ct. 3;
and COMMENT (1917) 26 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 305. Cf. (1915) 24 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 590. We often think of a chose in action as a physical thing, but in
reality it is an aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities of the
creditor of which the more important correlatives (duties, etc.) are in the debtor.
But it must also be remembered that when A owns a physical thing he has only
rights, etc. against X, Y, and Z. Cf. (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 721, 730.
'See Chapin v. Freeland (1886) 142 Mass. 383, 8 N. E. 128; Bryan v. Weems
(1856) 29 Ala. 423; Fears, Admr. v. Sykes (1858) 35 Miss. 633. For references
to cases collected, see note 8, infra.
8In accord with Campbell v. Holt, see Keller's Admr. v. McHuffman (1879)
15 W. Va. 64; Orman v. Van Arsdell (1904) 12 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48. Contra,
Chambers v. Gallagher, supra, citing many decisions; Bigelow v. Bemis (1861,
Mass.) 2 Allen, 486; Brown v. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21. The cases are col-
lected in 17 R. C. L. 675; 25 Cyc. 988; 12 C. J. 1225. The situation is complicated
when the debtor is a municipality. There the rule appears to be that the amend-
ment is valid since the municipality is not to be treated as an individual but as
a branch of the government. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Comrs.
(1014) 181 Ind. 335, 1O4 N. E. 497; State v. Seattle (91o) 57 Wash. 602, 107
Pal 827 and authorities collected in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188, note.
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We have been shown that courts were loath, until compelled by
business necessity, to concede the assignability of a chose in action
because there could be no manual tradition of that chose.9 It would
seem that the same attitude is at bottom responsible for the distinction
attempted in these cases.'10
Even before the statute has run A has a complex of legal relations
in the horse, so that as against all persons except B and those claiming
under him, A has all the elements of "ownership." As it was anciently
expressed, A had the "property" in the horse while B had only
a "right of property."'1  This is true whether the original taking was
tortious or not.12  A is, however, under a duty to B to return the
horse if B so elects, while B has a right to a judgment against A for
the horse or its value. So B has power with the aid of a court to
divest A of such legal interest as A has obtained by his possession and
claim of ownership, while A is under a corresponding liability to lose
such interest. And while B anciently had no power of transfer to a
third party X, he may now transfer to X his interest in the horse
though it is still in A's possession." When the statute of limitations
has run, A's duty and liability to B cease. And quite properly a statute
which thereafter creates a similar duty and liability in A to B, is held
to deprive A of his "property" without due process of law. C likewise
'2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 19o5) 226; (1917) 26
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 305." A distinction is attempted between cases of title by prescription and cases of
limitation'affecting the remedy only. "But, probably through failure to, at all
times, appreciate the distinction between limitation and prescription, many
authorities assume that it is as impossible to revive a lost remedy as to restore
a lost right." (877) 4 CENT. L. Joo. 412, approved in (1879) I Am. Dec. 534,
note. But why label one case "prescription" and the other "limitation"? Cf.
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, (x916) 29 HARv. L. R v. 816, 817:
'What happens, for example, upon a so-called transfer of title to real property
from A to B is, that the rights and other jural relations of A in relation to his
fellowmen with respect to the object transferred, are extinguished or divested
and that B becomes invested with similar though not necessarily identical rights
and other jural relat;ons. Whether in a given case A and B, either singly or
acting in cooperation, can do acts to which the law attaches such legal conse-
quences seems to be purely a question of positive law. In this respect it does
not seem possible to recognize that the transfer or assignment of a chose in
action involves anything fundamentally different from what is involved in the
transfer of a chose in possession."
Brian, C. J., Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, 9-4 discussed in Ames, op. cit., 541, 555. See
also Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 2o6, 241; and Bordwell, Property in
Chattels (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rxv. 374.
'2 Jefferies v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1856) 5 El. & B1. 8o; Fletcher v. Cole
(1852) 26 Vt. 170; Demick v. Chapman (1814, N. Y.) ii Johns. 132; Anderson
v. Gouldberg (1892) 51 Minn.- 294, 53 N. W. 636. Contra, Turley v. Tucker
(i86o) 6 Mo. 583. See cases collected in Brantly, Personal Property (i8gi) sec.
144.
' Ames, loc. cit., citing the ancient authorities.
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before the running of the statute has almost complete dominion of his
various assets, but he is under a duty to pay D and subject to a liability
that D with court aid will use his assets to pay the debt. And whereas
anciently D had no power of assignment he may now assign to y.14
And here, too, the expirition of the statutory period leaves C owing
no duty of payment to D and under no liability to D.' 5 Here, too, how
can a duty and liability on C's part be created by act of the legislature
without the taking away from one man and the giving to another
prohibited by the Federal Constitution as well as by most State con-
stitutions.1 The analogy to the situation existing between A and B
would possibly be clearer if C were not the original debtor to D, as
if D assigned to C by way of security his claim against E for money
due, and C later refused to reassign to D relying on the statute ;17 but
whether one end of the chose is E or is C, the analogy is so close that
the constitutional restriction should apply alike to either case.
The fact that C by new promise or part payment can create a duty
similar to that formerly owed to D, has been relied on as justifying
the legislative act so far as C is concerned. 8 But whether we think
of the new promise as "reviving" the old debt or as itself creating an
obligation, we must not forget that it is the act of the debtor which
is the operative act.'9 He exercises his own volition in making the
"4Ames, loc. cit.; Cook, loc. cit.
"The statement in the text is made advisedly, notwithstanding the frequent
statements that the debtor has a "moral duty" to pay, sufficient to support a
new promise. Legally a duty only exists as a correlative to a right in some one
else, which right is enforceable by court action or self help. Cf. Ames, loc. cit.
"The provision of the Connecticut Constitution is found in Art. 1, sec. 9.
Here as elsewhere the use of the label "property" clouds instead of clarifies the
discussion. The courts following Campbell v. Holt are in effect restricting the
term to interests in physical objects, whereas the ordinary usage, as for instance
in the settlement of estates, would include interests in choses in action. Does
not property mean anything of value to the individual? If so, any legal relation
is in effect property. This but emphasizes the point that the term is too inclusive
to be of assistance in solving most disputed points. A liberty or privilege to
contract where on6 pleased was recently held to be a "property right." Auburn
Draying Co. v. Wardell (1919, N. Y.) 124 N. E. 97.
' Yet the Massachusetts Supreme Court held by only a bare majority that the
rule as to chattels should be applied to (the privilege of) a seat upon the New
York Stock Exchange. Currier v. Studley (1893) 159 Mass. 17, 33 N. E. 709.
"Among others, by justice Miller in Campbell v. Holt, supra.
" The correct analysis would seem to be that given in Anson, Contracts (Cor-
bin's ed. igig) 156, viz., that the operative facts which give rise to the legal
relation upon which suit is brought are old debt plus new promise and that
without either the right enforceable in the suit does not exist. See also (ig1g)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817. So L. Hand, J. says that the orthodox theory
that the debt is still existing is "a theory full of vicious casuistry," but this
did not trouble the upper court which refers to the plea of the statute, as a
personal privilege which may be waived. Re Salmon, supra. But one may
waive a great many things, even an assertion of complete ownership, by non-
action in a lawsuit.
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new promise, which is quite a different thing from the legislative act,
when we come to consider who is doing the act of. "depriving." Nor
does the rule of law that a tort cannot be revived by new promise or
part payment help. This rule, in itself of doubtful logic and only to
be justified upon the theory that it is against public policy to keep
alive and give currency to tort claims, does not state a distinction be-
tween chattels and choses but between the forms of action, that is,
between assumpsit as distinguished from other forms of action.
20
In view of the varying attitudes of courts towards the statute of
limitations we might rest our conclusion on logic alone, on the ground
that there was no settled public policy on the question. Courts, while
recognizing the value of "statutes of repose" in the abstract, yet have
seen only the defendant trying to evade what seems to them a just obli-
gation, on the ground of lapse of time. Yet there is clearly a public
policy which recognizes that it is in general the weak case which is
delayed, that courts should not be compelled to resurvey old scenes
blurred by the passage of time or reopen old sores, in short that there
comes a time when bygones must be bygones, "that even the weariest
river flows somewhere to the sea."21 Now who is to meet with more
favor, A who has stolen B's horse, or C who borrowed money from D ?
It seems clear that there are more chances that the possessor of chattels
is an active wrongdoer than the one who owes a debt. The latter's
opportunities for wrongdoing, other than the mere inaction involved
in non-payment, are limited to fraud and duress. Surely the latter
should obtain repose by the lapse of time as well as the former.
22
' This rule has been applied to debt on bond. Ludlow v. Van Camp (1823)
7 N. J. L. 113. Also to debt on judgment (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817.
A new promise has been held effective where the tort is waived and suit is
brought in assumpsit. Moses v. Taylor (i888,'Dist. Col.) 6 Mackey, 255; contra,
Nelson v. Patterson (19o7) 229 III. 24o, 82 N. E. 229. The reason given for the
rule is that a new promise cannot "amount to a new tort." Goodwyn v. Good-
wyn (1854) 16 Ga. 114, 117. It has been said that no tort claim is assignable.
Gardner v. Adams (1834, N. Y.) 12 Wend. 297. But the general rule is that
claims for injuries except those for tort to the person are assignable. Comegys
v. Vasse (1828, U. S.) i Pet. 193, 213; Rice v. Stone (1861, Mass.) i Allen,
566. If old debt plus new promise will create a legal obligation, so should old
tort plus new promise, except where public policy intervenes, i. e., except in cases
of claims for tort to the person. Cf. Patterson v. Breitag (1893) 88 Iowa, 418,
55 N. W. 86, declining to enforce a note and mortgage given to satisfy a barred
claim for criminal conversation.
'Cf. Justice Story in Bell v. Morrison (1828, U.' S.) i Pet. 351, 36o, 362. In
Koyl v. Lay (1916) 194 Mo. App. 291, 187 S. W. 279, the court criticised plaintiffs
for waiting until all the other witnesses were dead. Statutes of limitation them-
selves do deprive one of property, but they had met the approval of the general
community before the time of written constitutions and are hence due process
of law. Cooley, Cotstitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 520.
n C appears to have an advantage over A as to the time when the statute
starts to run, if A's original possession of the chattel was not tortious, since the
statute does not run until the possession is adverse. Smith v. Townes's Admr.
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There is, however, one consideration that at first sight seems im-portant, namely, the interest of the innocent third person. Should notM who has purchased the horse of A be protected? Yes, though ifthis protection was of chief importance we ought to protect M withoutreference to some arbitrary length of time which has passed since Ahad violated a duty to B. M is relying on A's possession rather thanon the passage of time since A's breach of duty. But at most this issimply an added argument for the holding as to chattels and is notitself an argument against the application of the same rule to choses.And yet does M deserve protection more than N who is dealing withC on the basis of the latter's present credit? Though N's reliance uponthe present situation is based upon general credit rather than upon thepossession of specific articles, yet at bottom N's position appears similarto M's and from the standpoint of public policy he should be accordedlike protection to that accorded M.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the conflict of laws as affect-ing the running of the statute further than to suggest that here, too,chattels and choses should be treated alike. And it would seem thatthe situation discloses no real difficulty. D may have a right againstC enforcible in one state and a similar right enforcible during a differ-ent period in another state. Although this is often pointed to asdemonstrating that the statute affects only the remedy it means nomore than that D has more than one road to reach his goal. Yet aftertime has closed those roads and C no longer owes a duty of paymentto D, C's privilege and immunity as respects D should be and accordingto the better reasoned decisions are respected no matter what state Chappens to be in.23
In criticising the ground of the decision in Gilbert v. Selleck thewriter does not assert that the decision may be incorrect. For therean action had been pending in the Federal Court and was finally dis-missed in that court for lack of jurisdiction. The amendments passedby the legislature pending that suit provided that where an action hadbeen dismissed in the Federal Court for lack of jurisdiction suit mightbe started in the State Court within one year after such dismissal. 24
(1814, Va.) 4 Munf. 191. But neither does it run in C's case until there is abreach of duty, which is apparently all that "adverse" holding means. Undermost statutes, also, the time does not run while the cause of action is concealed,or as it is sometimes put, while the adverse holding is not open and notorious.Gatlin v. gaut (1go6) 6 Indian Terr. 254, 91 S. W. 35; State ex rel. McClure v.Northrop (1919, Conn.) io8 Atl.
'Shelby v. Guy (1826, U. S.) ii Wheat. 361, 371, 6 L. ed. 495; Brown v.Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21, 27; Pear's Admr. v. Sykes (1858) 35 Miss. 633.
Cf. COMMa1ENT (I919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 492."4 To make assurance trebly certain, the legislature passed three amendmentsto this effect, one each in 1913, 1915 and 1917. During each of these sessionsplaintiff's attorney was a member of the legislature and of the particular com-mittee which had the amendments in charge. Defendants were justified inadmitting that there was no opportunity for the operation of the rule that,where possible, statutes are not to be construed as operating retroactively.
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Actually the suit in question was started before the final decision in
the federal suit. Now it is well settled that before the statute has run
the legislature may extend the time2 5 and also that where 'suit is
brought before the statute has run amendments may later be made,
such as increasing the damages claimed or changing the mere form of
action.26 In effect it means that A's and C's duty and liability exist
so long as there is a suit pending, and that while such duty and liability
exist they may be extended by the legislature, which is obviously a
situation quite other than the recreation of a duty and liability after
they have ceased to exist.27  It is but little if any stretch to apply the
amendment theory to the transfer of a suit from one court to another.2 8
But such application should be made alike in the case of chattels as
well as choses between which there is for limitation purposes no real
distinction.
C. E. C.
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER AS APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL TRUSTS
The modern commercial or real estate trust, so frequently the subject
of subtle legal refinements, yet definitely sanctioned by law and exten-
sively employed in practice, has recently become exposed to a new
complication from a most unexpected source, the ancient and abstract
doctrine of merger.
In the case of Cunningham v. Bright," the sole trustee of a real
estate trust acquired by indorsement all of the transferable shares
representing the equitable interest in the trust. Subsequently the real
estate standing in his name as trustee was attached by his personal
creditor. The attachment was upheld, notwithstanding the ostensible
trust, on three independent grounds. Two of these grounds2 were
manifestly sufficient and do not now concern us. The third was that
I Davis v. Mills (19o3) 194 U. S. 451, 457, 24 Sup. Ct. 692; Danforth v. Groton
Water Co. (igoi) 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033.
'Moses v. Tayler (i88o, Dist. Col.) 6 Mackey, 255; Frederichsen v. Renard
(1918) 247 U. S. 207, 38 Sup. Ct. 450. See COMMENT (x9i8) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 1053; (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 693. The cases are collected
in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) :259.
' See discussion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Danforth v. Groton Water Co.,
supra. In Dunbar v. R. R. (19o2) 18i Mass. 383, 63 N. M. 916, criticised in
(19o2) I6 HARv. L. REv., he goes still further. Cf. Fleming v. Railroad (19Ol)
128 N. C. 80, 38 S. E. 253.
' In the present case the federal suit had dragged on for eight years and
for three years more on appeal, and the plaintiff may therefore be entitled to
little sympathy for such delay. Yet where the plaintiff has instituted suit before
the statute has run, the delay is partly the court's fault and another court is not
justified in penalizing the plaintiff for delays which the first court could control.
S(1917) 228 Mass. 385, 117 N. E. gog.2 First, the trust was merely a device for the evasion of attachments; second,
the equitable interest, as entitling the debtor to a present conveyance of the legal
estate, was itself subject to attachment under Mass. Rev. Law, 19o2, ch. 178,
sec. I.
